I n the era of globalization, are borders just arbitrary lines on the map? Our results show that border barriers are large and inhibit much trade.
and customs may reduce trade but surely provide noneconomic and economic gains to the nations that maintain them. Our analysis provides insights into the implications of removing the policy related barriers, either unilaterally or through customs unions or currency unions.
Two commonly used tools to evaluate the effects of border barriers are gravity equations and computable general equilibrium models. Gravity equations generally find that borders have a substantial negative effect on trade, while integration has a positive effect. But the estimated equations are a very crude tool for policy analysis because they are based on ad hoc specifications that can be seriously questioned on theoretical grounds. The ad hoc nature of standard gravity equations also precludes welfare analysis. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are potentially more useful for policy analysis but they have two drawbacks. First, they are simulated rather than estimated. Second, they are almost always based on a very large black box consisting of dozens to hundreds of equations. The first characteristic makes it difficult to know how reliable is the simulation model while the second characteristic makes it difficult to evaluate what drives the findings. Many CGE models have been applied to evaluate the impact of NAFTA, but almost always the implied effect on Mexican trade is only a small fraction of what we have seen in reality. Moreover, these models have the additional problem that while they capture the policy barriers of interest, such as tariffs under NAFTA, they omit other relevant trade barriers. We find that these other barriers are several to many times the size of formal trade barriers and their presence alters the proper analysis of the impact of removing formal barriers.
The goal of this paper is to provide a general understanding of how border barriers affect trade and welfare in the simple gravity with gravitas framework developed in our previous work. 3 We discuss three specific applications: (i) the effect of estimated total border barriers on trade and welfare among OECD countries, (ii) the effect of currency unions on trade and welfare, and (iii) the removal of tariff barriers under NAFTA. The framework deploys a theoretically grounded gravity model as a full general equilibrium model which is estimated (meeting the first objection cited earlier) and yet is simple enough to open the black box (meeting the second objection).
Types of Trade Costs
The nature of trade costs is important to our modeling and applications. Different types of costs require different treatments. We deploy a two-way classification, dividing costs into those that are related to national borders and those that are not, and further dividing border costs into those that generate rents (payments above opportunity cost) and those which do not.
Nonborder costs are largely natural trade costs that arise from distance and geographical irregularity interacting with the most efficient transport and communications technology. While most analysis on international trade policy ignores these nonborder barriers, they are important even if one's interest is in the implications of border barriers. The nonborder barriers generally reduce the effect of border barriers on trade and welfare. We will show that they also have implications for the terms of trade response to a reduction in border barriers.
Most international trade policy leads to border costs that involve rents. With tariffs the rent accrues to the government, and is rebated to the general public through tax and spending policy. Export and import quotas also involve rents, accruing to the license holders. A host of more devious nontariff barriers (discriminatory use of standards and the like) also lead to rents for private beneficiaries.
Most border barriers (see below for evidence) result from factors unrelated to trade policy, and do not generate rents. Differences in languages, cultures, customs, and regulations all impose barriers to trade that are specific to borders. Some of these barriers, such as differences in regulations and product standards, may be relatively easy to harmonize. Others, such as language and cultural differences, may be much more difficult to remove. Some barriers may only be removed after extreme measures, such as complete political integration. A full analysis would consider that some border barriers of this type confer national benefits that are missing from our analytic focus on the cost side.
The distinction between rent-bearing and nonrent-bearing trade costs is fundamental. Nonrent border barriers generate trade costs that involve real resources, such as gathering information about foreign regulations, hiring lawyers familiar with foreign laws, learning foreign languages, and adjusting product designs to make them consistent with foreign customs and regulations. Barriers involving rents involve a transfer between those who pay the rent and those receiving the rent. Nonrent border barriers have larger welfare implications than do tariffs and quotas. With nonrent border costs the higher price that the consumer pays for imports is a payment for real resources. In contrast, a tariff offsets the higher cost a consumer pays for imported goods with an increase in tariff revenue, which somehow gets rebated to the general public. Tariffs or quotas have welfare effects only as a result of the gap they create between marginal social costs and benefits. A reduction in the tariff will expand imports, an activity for which the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. This raises real income by reducing "deadweight loss."
Although in most of what follows we will assume that tariffs and quotas are the main border barriers involving rents, some other border barriers may involve rents as well. For example, the anti-McDonald's campaign of French anti-globalization icon José Bové and his allies presumptively protects inefficient French farmers and restaurateurs. One way to think about this is as a disinformation campaign about McDonald's. It involves no real resource costs and has exactly the same outcome as the imposition of a tariff or quota on imports from McDonald's. Another possible example is the deliberately insular customs among local business persons, making it difficult for foreign exporters to penetrate the market. Here it depends on what drives these insular customs. If they are the result of tight business relationships due to small distances between the firms, the resulting trade barriers may not be related to borders at all. If the insular customs are related to language and other cultural traits, they lead to nonrent border barriers. On the other hand, if the deliberately insular customs are the result of misinformation about doing business with foreigners, their effect is the same as that of a quota.
In the applications presented below, we have examples of reductions in both kinds of costs. As for rent-bearing costs, we analyze the effects of the reduction in tariffs resulting from NAFTA. We also analyze two examples of rent-free costs. The first involves border costs among OECD countries in 1993. 4 Since formal trade barriers among industrialized countries are not very high, we think of these mostly as nonrent border barriers, but for sensitivity analysis we will also consider the welfare implications if instead they were tariffs. Explaining what really lies behind the border barriers is an important task for future work. Second, we report on the effects of joining currency unions.
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The use of different moneys across borders can form a barrier as there are costs in exchanging currencies in spot and forward markets and traders face uncertainty about currency movements that cannot always be hedged. A common currency also leads to greater transparency of price differentials.
Understanding the Effects of Border Barriers
What factors determine the implications of border barriers for trade and welfare? We will employ a very simple, theoretically grounded gravity equation that we developed in recent work, which easily lends itself to addressing these questions in a variety of different contexts. 6 The theory tells us that after controlling for size, trade between two countries depends on relative trade barriers. What matters is the bilateral barrier between the countries relative to the average trade barriers each country faces with all its trading partners, which we refer to as "multilateral resistance."
The basic idea from the exporters' point of view is that each country produces a certain quantity of goods that needs to be sold somewhere. Relatively more goods will be sold to the countries with which border barriers are relatively low compared to other trading partners. The basic idea from the importers' point of view is that each country demands the goods of each other country, but relatively more goods will be purchased from countries for which the importer's trade barriers are relatively low. The Anderson and van Wincoop model rigorously shows that size-adjusted bilateral trade depends on the ratio of bilateral resistance to the product of the multilateral resistances of each partner.
We utilize the estimated model as a computable general equilibrium model in order to simulate the effects of changes in various border barriers on trade flows and welfare. The commonly used empirical gravity equations are in contrast both estimated inconsistently and unable to be used for general equilibrium simulations. The typical setup assumes that only bilateral barriers matter for trade between two regions or countries. Some more recent work has nodded at the problem of barriers between a country and all of its partners, but it does so in a way inconsistent with the theory.
A Formal Treatment in the Absence of Rents
The gravity equation is derived using the properties of market clearance and the CES structure of demand. We focus on final demand here, but an essentially identical structure emerges with intermediate demand systems. Each region produces a unique good and desires to consume the goods of all regions. The seller's price at the factory gate of region i, p i , is raised by the trade cost factors t ij for each consuming region j: p ij = p i t ij . The exporter incurs the trade cost and passes it on to the importer. Let income in region j be given by y j. The CES demand structure implies that the value of shipments from i to j is (1) Here, {β i }, σ are the distribution and substitution parameters of the CES structure. Now we derive the gravity model. Market clearance implies that:
Substituting the CES price index definition into equation (2) yields a system which can be solved for the scaled supply prices {β i p i } 1-σ as implicit functions of the trade costs and the observable incomes. But Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) show that with symmetry, the solution is the same as the solution to:
Substituting into equation (1) and equation (2) we obtain our version of the gravity model: Equation system (3) was estimated using nonlinear least squares in Anderson and van . The market clearing equations yield estimates of P i 1 -σ for each region. These are substituted into the gravity equation to compute the level of trade implied by the model.
The gravity model can very usefully be treated as a simulation model. For this purpose we close the supply side of the model with the simplest assumption possible-an endowment economy. Thus each region is assumed to be endowed with a stock of goods ȳ i , nominal income y i being equal to p i ȳ i . Given the estimates of the trade cost parameters, we calculate the effect of various changes on trade flows. 9 We can also calculate the effect of changes in trade costs on welfare:
Welfare is therefore inversely related to the average trade barrier a country faces with all its trading partners, the multilateral resistance term P i . We will now discuss a set of general implications of the model that has just been described. This will facilitate the interpretation of our findings when we conduct various policy experiments below. We will define size-adjusted trade as the bilateral flow divided by the product of importer and exporter GDP and multiplied by world GDP. The following five properties then follow from the model:
1. Border barriers lead to a larger percentage increase in size-adjusted domestic trade in small countries than in large countries.
Countries either export the goods they produce or sell them domestically. Border barriers only affect international trade, therefore reducing the relative barrier of domestic trade. Small countries rely more on exports than large countries, so that border barriers raise their average trade barrier more and the relative barrier of domestic trade is reduced more. This leads to a larger increase in domestic trade of small countries.
There is another way to look at this, which leads to the same conclusion. In a world consisting of a large and small country, a given reduction in trade between them leads to an identical absolute increase in domestic trade within both countries. But since the level of domestic trade is much smaller in the small country, the percentage increase in domestic trade is much larger for the small country.
2. Border barriers reduce size-adjusted trade between large countries more than between small countries, but they have a larger effect on the welfare of small countries.
Since border barriers raise average trade barriers more for small countries, the relative barrier between small countries rises less than between larger countries. Therefore trade drops less among small than large countries.
The welfare effect is in contrast larger for small countries. We saw that welfare is inversely related to the average trade barrier a country faces. Small countries rely more on international trade, so that border barriers raise their average trade barrier more than for large countries, resulting in a bigger decline in welfare. This is a familiar theme in international trade analysis. Small countries get most of the gain from trade.
3. The rise in size-adjusted trade among the members of a regional trade agreement (RTA) is smaller the larger the size of the union. On the other hand, the welfare effect is larger the bigger the union.
The average trade barrier for the members of an RTA drops more the bigger the size of the union. Therefore relative trade barriers between those members drop less the bigger the union's size, leading to a smaller rise in trade among the union's members. On the other hand, the bigger drop in average trade barriers for a large RTA leads to a bigger rise in welfare. A world union has the largest possible effect on welfare, but the smallest effect on trade.
This also illustrates how the traditional empirical gravity approach, which only controls for bilateral barriers, can lead to misleading conclusions. For the same drop in border barriers in a small RTA as in a large RTA, the traditional gravity approach would predict that the impact on trade is the same.
4. The rise in size-adjusted trade among the members of an RTA is smaller the higher the level of preunion trade among its members. But the welfare effect is larger the higher the level of pre-union trade.
This result is closely related to the previous one about the size of the union. A reduction in border barriers among a set of countries reduces their average trade barriers more the greater their level of pre-union trade. If the countries are located far apart and are trading little to start with, a reduction in border barriers between them will have much less of an effect on their average trade barriers. As discussed above, a larger reduction in average border barriers leads to a smaller effect of the RTA on trade, but a bigger effect on welfare.
5. The effect of border barriers on trade and welfare is smaller the larger the nonborder trade barriers.
This result arises because nonborder trade barriers, such as transport or communication costs, lead to a home bias in trade. It is most easily understood by considering the extreme of very high nonborder barriers due to prohibitive transport costs. In that case there would be a low level of international trade even in the absence of border costs. The increase in international trade that can be achieved by removing border barriers is naturally very small.
The Role of Rents
We now introduce rents in the form of tariffs. The tariff on shipments from i to j is τ ij , leading to the following modified trade cost expression:
Let s kj be the CES spending share on good k in country j, p kj m kj / z j = (β k p kj / P j ) 1 -σ , where m denotes the quantity demanded and z denotes expenditure. Tariff revenue is rebated to consumers so that total consumer income expended by residents of region j becomes
The income of region j can be solved using the system of demand equations as:
Nominal income is multiplied on the right hand side by a tariff multiplier, reflecting the rebated tariff revenue. As a result of this complication we now no longer get the simple gravity equation (3), but x ij = p ij m ij / τ ij can still be derived by substituting the solution to the modified goods market equilibrium conditions into the modified demand equation. The trade results are not much different than in the model without rents and the five general implications of the model listed above still hold with regard to trade. The welfare implications change significantly though once rents are introduced. Rents are a transfer, so a reduction confers a benefit to consumers offset by a loss to the former rent recipient. Utility of residents from region i becomes (5) The difference with the welfare expression for the case without rents given by equation (4) is the tariff multiplier term.
In order to compare welfare effects of borders with and without rents it is useful to decompose the welfare effect of lowering border barriers into three components: (i) the direct welfare impact measured at the old terms of trade and trade levels, (ii) the welfare impact associated with a change in trade levels, (iii) the welfare impact associated with a change in the terms of trade. In the applications below we will decompose the welfare effect into each of the components described above. We will now focus on the first two effects, keeping the terms of trade constant.
For the no rent case, differentiating equation (4) while holding the terms of trade constant, we have: This is a familiar expression from consumer theory. Intuitively when a trade cost falls, real resources are saved (in terms of iceberg trade costs, less is melted
away). We will use the label "resource effect" to denote the direct impact on welfare with nonrent border barriers. This welfare effect is entirely associated with the first type of welfare gains, measured at constant terms of trade and trade levels. There will be an optimal change in trade levels when nonrent border barriers change. The welfare effect from that is second order, and therefore does not show up in the expression above. Since trade levels were optimal before the change in barriers, the Envelope Theorem tells us that a marginal change in the trade composition does not have any first order welfare effects. A second order welfare effect can nonetheless be very big when the change in trade barriers is large, which will be illustrated in the first application below.
For the rent case, differentiating equation (5) with respect to τ ji , and using Shephard's Lemma for the CES case, all when holding the terms of trade constant, gives (6) Here π ji = p ji / t ji is the import price net of tariffs and ∂m ki / ∂p ji is the compensated demand derivative. The transition from the first to the second line formalizes the intuition that a change in a rent-bearing trade cost has no net effect at constant trade volumes because it is a transfer. Thus in contrast to the case without rents the direct effect of the change in trade costs, the first welfare effect, is equal to zero. The summation term on the second line is familiar from public finance and trade policy analysis-it is marginal deadweight loss. Trade is allocated such that the marginal willingness to pay p ji exceeds marginal cost π ji and a reduction in demand of such a good as a result of a rise in its price is welfare reducing. The second line therefore gives the second welfare effect, associated with the change in trade levels. In contrast to the case without rents, here it is a first order welfare effect.
For the purpose of analyzing regional trade agreements, it is useful to make a further decomposition of the first order welfare effect associated with the change in trade levels when there are rents. Note that regional trade agreements lower a set of bilateral tariffs in the partnership while maintaining others. At constant world prices of all goods (that is, those of the partners, too), regional free trade agreements are simultaneously a move toward free trade,
creating added trade volume, and a move away from free trade, diverting trade from the rest of the world (ROW) to a partner. A large and rather confusing literature was initiated by the classic Viner analysis of free trade agreements focusing on the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. 11 In our decomposition, trade creation increases welfare while trade diversion reduces it. Formally expanding the summation term on the second line of equation (6), we have, assuming that i and j are members of the regional agreement N, the welfare effect of a small reduction in bilateral tariff τ ji is proportional to:
The first term is positive if there is only one partner (since p ii -π ii = 0 and ∂m ji / ∂p ji < 0). The second term is ordinarily negative (and is necessarily so for the CES case). Regional integration involves changing the set of bilateral tariffs among the partners, hence summing the preceding expression across all bilateral tariff reductions. The aggregate of the first term should again be positive while the aggregate of the second term will be negative. We call these terms marginal trade creation and marginal trade diversion respectively and we use a discrete analog to the expressions above to compute them.
The final welfare effect is the result of terms of trade changes. Similar terms of trade effects apply to the case with and without rents. It is common to believe that only large countries can affect their terms of trade through tariffs on imported goods. Strictly speaking no country is small in the gravity model since, similarly to most applied general equilibrium models, each country is assumed to produce unique goods. Nevertheless tiny countries would have little effect on their terms of trade in a frictionless world. If tariffs were the only trade barriers that exist, since they are low, small countries would again have little power over their terms of trade. But as we have pointed out, there are many other trade barriers, both border barriers and nonborder barriers, which swamp the tariff barriers in effect. These all lead to a home bias in trade.
A small country can affect its terms of trade substantially by changing tariffs on imported goods because it buys a disproportionately large fraction of its own goods due to high border barriers. A drop in a nation's own tariff will ordinarily lead to a terms of trade deterioration, while a drop in the tariffs of
trading partners will lead to a terms of trade improvement. This point will be further elucidated below in the discussion of NAFTA. Tables 1 and 2 report some results based on estimation of the theoretical gravity equation in Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) for U.S. states, Canadian provinces, and twenty other OECD countries (denoted ROW). Table 1 reports the tariff equivalent of estimated border barriers assuming an elasticity of substitution equal to five among goods of different countries. The welfare results in table 2 also depend on this elasticity. In contrast the trade change numbers of table 1 are not sensitive to the elasticity. The estimation assumes a single border barrier among the entire set of ROW countries.
Application 1: Border Barriers among OECD countries
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Most of the border barriers have a tariff equivalent in the neighborhood of 50 percent. Even if the elasticity of substitution were as high as ten, which is above most estimates in the literature, the border barriers would still be around 20 percent. It is therefore clear that the policies, institutions, and regulations 12. See Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) . Our results only indicate that they are large and that they have large consequences for trade and welfare. Table 1 also reports the increase in international trade achieved by the removal of all border barriers. We are able to compute these numbers by solving the general equilibrium model both before and after the removal of all the border barriers. The removal of border barriers raises trade between the United States and Canada by 79 percent, while raising trade among ROW countries on average by 41 percent. While these are substantial numbers, the enormous size of the reported border barriers might be expected to cause much larger trade changes. The explanation is that trade between countries is not determined by the absolute size of the border barriers, but rather by relative trade barriers. While borders raise barriers between any pair of countries, they also raise barriers of each partner with all their other trading partners (only domestic barriers are unaffected by borders). This significantly dampens the effect of borders on relative barriers and therefore on trade. For example, trade between the United States and Canada would have increased by a factor of five if we removed the bilateral border barrier between them while keeping constant the average trade barriers that both countries face with all their trading partners.
United States-Canada trade rises a bit more than trade among other OECD countries, even though the United States-Canada barrier is a little lower. This is because the United States is a large country, so that its average trade barrier is less affected by borders. This leads to a more substantial drop in relative trade barriers that the United States faces with other countries, and therefore a bigger rise in trade. Trade between the United States and ROW countries rises even more since ROW countries tend to be larger than Canada.
It is useful to cast these findings in the context of the so-called trade home bias puzzle. Estimation of empirical gravity equations has found enormous effects of borders on trade. One well-known finding is that, after controlling for distance, trade between Canadian provinces is about twenty times larger than between provinces and U.S. states.
13 Partially, as we have shown in our recent work, this is a result of estimating a misspecified equation, which focuses on bilateral rather than relative trade barriers. To a large extent it is also the result of a very large increase in domestic trade. Our earlier work showed that borders raise trade between Canadian provinces by a factor of six. As dis-cussed above, for small countries border barriers significantly reduce the relative barrier associated with domestic trade, leading to a large increase in domestic trade. It is therefore misleading to interpret the trade home bias numbers that have been reported in the traditional gravity literature as indicators of the effect of borders on international trade. Table 2 reports the increase in welfare following the removal of border barriers, measured as the percentage rise in the real level of consumption. The number for ROW refers to an unweighted average of the percentage welfare increase of the twenty other OECD countries. These results show that the estimated border barriers have enormous welfare effects, as large as 52 percent for Canada. The numbers depend on the assumed elasticity of substitution of five, but even for a high elasticity of ten, Canadian welfare would still rise by 20 percent if all border barriers were removed. As anticipated above, the welfare effect is smaller for a large country such as the United States as it relies less on international trade. Nonetheless even the United States stands to gain significantly from a reduction in border barriers. The results suggest the importance in future work of trying to understand what costs lie behind the border barrier.
The breakdown of the welfare effect into the three components discussed above shows that they are all important.
14 The resource effect is the biggest, about half of the total welfare effect for the United States and ROW countries and slightly less for Canada. Even though the trade effect is technically a second order effect, the welfare improvement associated with it is nonetheless very large, as much as 13 percent for Canada. This is because the size of the border barriers is big. For a small change in border barriers the welfare improvement associated with the change in trade patterns would be small compared to the resource and terms of trade effects (which are both first order effects).
The terms of trade effect is negative for the United States, while positive for Canada and the average of the ROW countries. The latter hides the fact that the largest ROW countries, Japan, Germany, and France, experience negative terms of trade effects, while the smaller ones experience a terms of trade improvement. As expected, large countries gain from trade restrictions. The relative price of goods from small countries will rise when border barriers are removed since they rely more on exports for the sale of their goods. Lower border barriers raise export demand and the price.
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14. The sum of the numbers in the three columns that provide the breakdown do not exactly add up to the total in the first column. That is because the numbers in the breakdown columns are cumulative. For example, for Canada 0.516 = 1.183 * 1.129 * 1.135-1.
We have assumed that the estimated border barriers are nonrent barriers. As a form of sensitivity analysis it is useful to compute the welfare implications if the estimated barriers were instead tariff barriers. In that case the welfare increase is 2.9 percent for the United States, 30 percent for Canada, and 16.8 percent for ROW countries. So even if rents were involved in some of the estimated border barriers, they still have very large welfare effects. These numbers are close to the welfare effects in table 2 when subtracting the resource effect, which does not apply with rent barriers.
The results reported here depend on our estimate of nonborder barriers, which in the model is captured by distances within and between regions and countries. If there were no distance-related barriers, the welfare effects would be even larger: 19 percent for the United States, 75 percent for Canada, and 58 percent, on average, for ROW countries. Reductions in the costs of transportation and communication therefore make the existing border barriers only more important.
One might argue that these large welfare improvements are not realistically attainable since the policy experiment we have conducted here, the removal of all border barriers, is not easy to achieve in practice. We will therefore now turn to a policy experiment that is more easily implemented, the formation of currency unions.
Application 2: Currency Unions
Rose and van have applied the theoretical gravity model to determine the size of the border barrier associated with the use of different currencies across national borders, as well as its effects on trade and welfare. 15 The analysis is based on a large data set of 143 countries, of which thirty-six are part of currency unions. Existing currency unions, such as the CFA franc zone in Africa and the East Caribbean currency area, are relatively small, but provide potentially useful information about the extent to which currency unions reduce border barriers. This information can then be applied to evaluate the impact of other currency unions that are not yet in existence.
With an elasticity of substitution among goods equal to five, the tariff equivalent of the national money border barrier is found to be 26 percent. This implies that about half of the total border barriers reported in table 1 may be attributable to the use of different currencies. Table 3 reports some implications of this for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and a couple of dollarization scenarios. Trade among the existing twelve EMU members would rise by 59 percent, while welfare would rise by 11 percent. While the effect on trade is significant, it is dampened by the fact that these countries already had high trade levels among each other before EMU. As discussed above, the larger the size of a currency union and the higher the trade levels before the union, the smaller its effect on trade and the larger its effect on welfare. The table shows that an expansion of EMU to all fifteen EU members would reduce the trade increase to 40 percent, while raising the rise in welfare to 14 percent.
The dollarization scenarios also show substantial increases in both trade and welfare. When comparing different countries that could dollarize, those with closer trade relationships with the United States face a smaller increase in trade but a larger increase in welfare once the dollar is adopted. The comparison is quite stark when comparing Argentina and Canada. Argentinian trade with the United States is expected to rise by 132 percent, while Canadian trade with the United States is expected to rise by only 38 percent. Nonetheless the Canadians experience a much larger increase in welfare of 30 percent versus 3.3 percent for Argentina.
The final row of the table shows that the biggest possible monetary union, among all countries in the world, would raise trade by only 10 percent, but leads to a very large average increase in welfare of 21 percent.
These estimation results reported by could be subject to reverse causality and omitted variables bias. But in another paper, Rose has found that the results hold up under a host of sensitivity analyses, including an extensive search for omitted variables and the use of instrumental variables. 16 There is also little evidence in the political science 16. See Rose (2000) . literature that countries join currency unions to increase trade, suggesting that reverse causality is not an issue.
There is another piece of evidence which also suggests that the impact of national borders is closely linked with the use of different currencies across borders. It has been found that relative prices of the same goods are much more volatile across cities in different countries than across cities in the same country, even after controlling for distance. 17 This evidence has been closely linked to nominal exchange rate volatility across locations in different countries. By itself this does not necessarily imply, though, that the use of different moneys across borders provides a barrier to trade.
Application 3: NAFTA
In the final application of our theoretical gravity model we consider the implications of tariff removals as part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Negotiations leading to NAFTA began in June 1990, an accord was signed in December 1992, and the agreement went into effect on January 1, 1994. For some goods the existing tariffs were removed immediately, while for others there was a gradual phaseout, ranging from five to fifteen years. Average tariffs on U.S. exports to Mexico were 18.6 percent before NAFTA, with an average phaseout time of 5.6 years. Average tariffs on Mexican exports to the United States were 5.9 percent, with an average phaseout time of 1.4 years. 17. See Rogers (1996, 2000) . 18. See Kowalczyk and Davis (1998), p. 236-39. 19 . There is good reason to only look at the average of exports and imports in the data since Mexico experienced large real exchange rate movements that affected the difference between exports and imports (the trade balance).
20. See Hufbauer and Schott, 1992, pp. 58-59 , for predicted NAFTA trade flow changes from a set of models. The estimates imply growth of U.S.-Mexican trade ranging from 5 to 25 percent. The data imply growth of 80 percent or more.
In order to evaluate the implications of NAFTA we conduct the following exercise. We start from the world model of twenty-two OECD countries for which we estimated total (nonrent) border barriers in 1993. We then add Mexico to this model, allowing for both nonrent and tariff barriers between Mexico and other countries. We assume that the nonrent barriers between the United States and Mexico are of the same size as between the United States and Canada, while the nonrent barriers between Mexico and all other countries are the same as between Canada and other countries. It is assumed that all tariffs on Mexican imports and exports are the same as those between Mexico and the United States. We then consider the implications of a removal of all tariffs on trade between Mexico and the United States and between Mexico and Canada. This is done by solving the general equilibrium model before and after the removal of the tariffs.
The results are reported in tables 4 and 5. The effect on size-adjusted trade levels is shown in table 4. The model predicts an increase in exports from Mexico to the United States of 59 percent and an increase in exports from the United States to Mexico of 74 percent. The same changes are predicted with 9 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 United regard to trade with Canada. These numbers correspond quite closely to the data.
In 1993, which we use as the pre-NAFTA year, (size-adjusted) MexicoUnited States trade was 40 percent lower than (size-adjusted) United StatesCanada trade. In the model Mexico-United States trade was 41 percent lower Note, by the way, that almost all of the increase in United States-Mexico trade occurs in one year, 1995. This is a bit deceptive, though, since Mexico experienced a large devaluation that lowered its GDP when measured in dollars. Since most of its trade is priced in dollars, this devaluation by itself leads to a large jump in the size-adjusted trade measure shown in figure 1. Without the devaluation the size-adjusted trade level would likely have increased more gradually. A comparison of 1993 to 1999 data is therefore most relevant.
The model predicts that Mexican exports to the other OECD countries, rest of the world (ROW), rise by 19 percent, while Mexican imports from ROW countries drop by 25 percent (fifth and sixth rows of table 4). The drop in imports from ROW countries is a result of trade diversion, while the rise in exports to ROW countries is the result of the predicted drop in the relative price of Mexican goods. The relative price of Mexican goods falls (the Mexican terms of trade deteriorate) because Mexican consumers switch to buying more products from the United States and Canada, and less from Mexico, after the removal of tariffs on those imports. In the data both size-adjusted exports to ROW countries and imports from ROW countries rise after NAFTA, but this is likely the result of a reduction in trade barriers with ROW countries independent of NAFTA. Table 4 also reports to what extent the trade changes are the result of the removal of Mexican import tariffs versus the removal of U.S. and Canadian tariffs on Mexican exports. Not surprisingly given its much bigger size, most of the trade changes result from the removal of the Mexican import tariffs. It is noteworthy that the removal of either set of tariffs raises trade in both directions. This is a result of general equilibrium considerations. For example, while one would expect lower Mexican import tariffs to raise Mexican imports, the resulting drop in the relative price of Mexican goods also raises Mexican exports.
The welfare effects of NAFTA, reported in table 5, are quite revealing. First consider the removal of Mexican tariffs. It results in trade creation that raises welfare by 1.4 percent, offset slightly by trade diversion that lowers welfare by 0.2 percent. But the removal of Mexican tariffs leads to a deterioration in Mexico's terms of trade that results in a 2.5 percent drop in welfare. The terms of trade deterioration overwhelms the gains from trade creation, leading on balance to a 1.3 percent welfare drop.
The large effect of the Mexican terms of trade deterioration on welfare may not be surprising in light of our previous discussion of the fact that even small countries can significantly affect their terms of trade. Here we will shed further light on this result by somewhat simplifying the high dimensional complexity and nonlinearity of our gravity model. Suppose that we consider the market for the national product of Mexico, broken into two parts: its sales in Mexico and its sales to everyone else. The unilateral tariff reduction lowers Mexico's prices for U.S. and Canadian goods, but let us for simplicity assume that Mexico's demand shift is too small to raise the supply price of U.S. or Canadian goods. Mexican demand shifts away from Mexican goods, so the Mexican supply price must fall to clear the market. For simplicity let us assume that the effect of a fall in the Mexican supply price on the U.S. and Canadian price indexes P is negligible. Now all the action needed to clear the market for Mexican goods is isolated to Mexico's supply price and its consumer price index; we suppress changes in rest of the world prices p R , P R . The unilateral Mexican liberalization lowers τ RM and induces a change in p M . Define δ ≡ (τ RM -1) / τ RM ,the ad valorem tariff imposed by Mexico on goods from the rest of the world, defined as a percent of the domestic price. Mexican income is equal to revenue from goods sales plus tariff revenue, or
The market clearance equation for Mexican goods is:
where k is a constant under the simplifying assumptions. The Mexican expenditure share of Mexican goods is given by:
Substituting into the preceding equation, and noting that p R t RM = π RM τ RM = π RM / (1 -δ), we have a nonlinear equation which can be solved for changes in p M as a function of changes in δ.
Differentiating and solving with some simplification, we obtain, where â denotes percentage change:
A fall in Mexico's tariff will induce a less than proportional reduction in the Mexican supply price, but when Mexico consumes a large proportion of its output, the effect can be large. (Note that the expression for p M / dδ is increasing in s MM .) Using σ = 5 and s MM = 0.7, the 18.6 percent tariff removal used in our simulations implies a Mexican supply price decline of 8.6 percent. The welfare effect of this change, if evaluated from the "free trade" position (our setup suppresses the non-NAFTA countries so Mexican liberalization is equivalent to free trade), is (1 -s MM )p M where the nominal income decline is partially offset by the cheaper Mexican consumer price. This implies a welfare loss of 2.6 percent, quite close to the 2.5 percent reported in table 5. The key element of this result is the large fraction spent on Mexican goods by Mexicans themselves. It illustrates the importance of introducing in the model all the nontariff trade barriers (both border and nonborder barriers), which leads to a similar home bias toward Mexican goods as observed in the data. Table 5 also reports the effect of the removal of the U.S. and Canadian tariffs on their imports from Mexico. This shifts demand toward Mexican goods and results in a terms of trade improvement for Mexico that improves welfare by 1.1 percent. The overall net effect is a loss of 0.3 percent. The United States and Canada experience a small 0.1 percent improvement in welfare, while welfare of ROW countries is virtually unaffected.
Our conclusion that NAFTA harmed Mexico differs from the conclusion of the computable general equilibrium model literature. 21 The difference is due to two factors. First our gravity model with high nontariff border costs implies large terms of trade movements that are missed in the standard CGE literature. Second our gravity model is an endowment economy. The disaggregated CGE models allow for specialization as a result of liberalization, adding to the gains from NAFTA. Various other CGE models allow for gains due to increased output of industries with scale economies and for dynamic gains due to foreign investment in Mexico. We think that our estimate of Mexico's gains from NAFTA is too low because it omits the resource reallocation featured in conventional CGE models. But in contrast we think the conventional CGE models give estimates which are too high because they understate the terms of trade changes featured in the gravity model.
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21. Hufbauer and Schott (1992) ; Francois and Shiells (1994) .
The welfare effects of NAFTA are very small compared to those in table 2. Partially this is because in table 2 we considered the removal of nontariff barriers among OECD countries, which also have a significant resource effect. But as noted earlier, even if the estimated barriers among OECD countries were tariff barriers, the welfare gains would still be large, for example 16.8 percent for ROW countries. There are several reason why the effect on Mexican welfare is so small in table 5. First, if tariffs on Mexican exports had been the same as on Mexican imports, the model predicts that Mexican welfare would rise by 1.5 percent. Second, if additionally we remove the nonrent border barriers, NAFTA would raise Mexican welfare by 5.9 percent.
Finally if on top of this we raise the tariffs to 50 percent, which is the size of the border barriers reported in table 1, removing these tariffs would raise Mexican welfare by 14.8 percent. So to summarize, the effect on Mexican welfare is small because (i) tariff rates are asymmetric (much higher on Mexican imports than exports), (ii) the tariffs are much smaller than the nontariff border barriers, and (iii) the presence of nontariff border barriers dampens the welfare effect of tariff reductions.
Conclusion
We have shown that policies associated with borders are very costly, even in a world with low formal trade policy barriers. The potential for deep integration even between such closely associated countries as Canada and the United States remains astonishingly large. Small countries have much more to gain from integration than large countries, but even huge countries such as the United States will earn substantial benefit from deep integration.
The large size of the estimated border barriers points to the need for more research to understand what the costs are and why they are so high. The benefit of currency unions in our work provides a useful clue, but the implied costs are very high compared to intuitive notions of the cost of exchange rate uncertainty and foreign exchange.
Methodologically our work indicates that further development and use of the gravity model is likely to yield useful insights. Its attractiveness combines ease of estimation, success in prediction, and the consistency and power of readily understood general equilibrium structure.
Comments and Discussion
Charles Engel: Anderson and van Wincoop (AvW) have made an important contribution by analyzing border barriers in the context of Anderson's gravity model. 1 AvW's earlier paper shows how border effects should be estimated in the context of the gravity model. 2 In the present study, the authors take parameters estimated from the empirical work and use them in the gravity model to measure the welfare effects of borders. This is truly excellent work, a perfect example of economics as a science. AvW's previous work clarifies exactly what is meant by a "border effect" in the context of a theoretical model. 3 The theoretical model is used as a guide to quantifying the border effect. Because AvW have estimated a structural model, they can tell us the effects on welfare and on trade volumes of changes in trade policy or other border barriers, as they do in this study.
The paper is also ingenious because of a number of specific points it makes about border barriers. At some level these points must be obvious to a trade economist, but these are the types of observations that only become obvious once they are pointed out. AvW note that (a) much of the border effect must arise from barriers that do not create rents, so that their welfare impact is much greater than rent-producing barriers such as tariffs; (b) the impact of a border barrier on trade between two countries does not depend so much on the size of the barrier, but the size of the barrier relative to "multilateral" barriers; and (c) the welfare costs of these barriers are not directly related to the amount of trade that is diverted.
I believe that the work of Anderson and van Wincoop is a starting point, and there are many avenues that lead from their recent papers. In this paper, AvW point to the relative simplicity and clarity of their gravity model as compared to computable general equilibrium models, which they say "are simulated rather than estimated, and … are almost always based on a very large black box consisting of dozens to hundreds of equations." But I shall argue that in some ways the model of AvW is surely too simple, and the quantitative answers provided by AvW are too rough at this stage to be useful as a guide to policymakers.
I shall also make some comments specific to AvW's calculations of the benefits of a currency union. My concerns there are with the interpretation of the empirical work of Rose and van Wincoop. 4 As I have indicated, the paper is a major step in the literature because of its conceptualization. AvW show how we can estimate a border effect, and how to translate those estimates into structural parameters of the theoretical gravity model-and they do a beautiful job of it.
As AvW discuss, border effects may arise from policies that erect trade barriers. Policies such as tariffs or quotas are easily observable and quantifiable, and generally create rents. But Anderson and van Wincoop make a good case that many border barriers do not create rents in any obvious ways. Barriers due to language, customs, or product standards, for example, may contribute to border effects but do not generate rents. The deadweight loss from these barriers is much greater, they show, than from rent-creating barriers.
On the one hand, policy aimed at removing these barriers is likely to generate much higher welfare gains than reduction of rent-producing barriers. But on the other hand, these barriers are not so easily eliminated by policy choices. Anderson and van Wincoop focus on one perfect example of a nonrent barrier that policy can influence-the choice of currency. One of the greatest perceived economic advantages for Europe of the adoption of the euro is the increased ease of international transactions within Europe. Money's role is to coordinate buyers with sellers, and that role is more beneficial the larger the club that uses the money. Another area where policy might reduce nonrent barriers is the coordination of safety regulations. If AvW have accurately measured the size of the nonrent barriers, it seems that trade policymakers should surely pay greater attention to ways in which these barriers can be reduced.
I will turn to some criticisms of the specific model that AvW use to quantify the effects of border barriers. But one of the major contributions of this paper is the set of general insights into how border barriers affect trade qualitatively. The five properties of the model that AvW highlight help sharpen our intuition of how border barriers affect trade, and what the possible impact of policy changes might be.
The model can be described easily. It is a model of trade among regions. Some countries have more than one region, while others are composed of only one region. (As will become apparent shortly, a major reservation I have about the AvW model is the seeming arbitrariness with which nations are carved into regions.) Each region is endowed with a single unit of a good that is distinct from goods created in other regions. All agents in the world have identical CES preferences. There are iceberg transportation costs between regions and iceberg border barriers. (That is, trade across distance and borders have a cost that is manifested in the destruction of some of the traded good.)
The reservations about the usefulness of taking this model to the data that I shall discuss below revolve around the following features that are not included in the model:
1. Goods are not produced using factors of production.
2. There are no import-competing industries or nontraded industries in each region.
3. The CES assumption may not be appropriate. 4. The model provides no guidance as to how many regions a country should be divided into. The measured welfare and trade volume effects of border barriers depend on the number of regions in a country. As I shall explain shortly, this point is not separate from the third point listed above.
The chief aim of AvW's previous work, and a secondary goal of this study, is to resolve the puzzle raised by the work of McCallum and others. 5 McCallum found that trade between a pair of Canadian provinces was much greater than trade between a Canadian province and a U.S. state, even accounting for distance and size. The difference was so large-a factor of about twenty-that it throws into doubt the view that international markets have become relatively well integrated.
AvW claim that relatively modest trade barriers can lead to a large home bias in trade for a small country. Suppose we model Canada as being composed of ten equally sized regions (call them "provinces"), and the United States as fifty equally sized regions (call them "states"). These are the only two countries in this simplified world. In the AvW model, essentially all output of a region is exported. That is, under free trade, households in each region would consume 1/60 of their output and export 59/60. Under completely free trade each region in the United States or Canada exports exactly 1/60 of its output to each of the other fifty-nine regions.
What is the effect of a border barrier that cuts trade in half between the United States and Canada but not between regions in each country? Suppose each region produces sixty units. Under free trade, each Canadian province exports fifty units to the United States and nine units to other Canadian provinces. (Each region exports one unit to each other region in the United States and Canada. If Canadian exports to the United States are cut to twentyfive, there would be thirty-five units remaining to be consumed within the ten provinces of Canada. That is, each Canadian province would export 3.5 units to each other Canadian region and only 0.5 units to each U.S. state. Even though the barrier only cut off half of trade, it appears that the home bias is greater because trade between Canadian provinces is seven times greater than between a Canadian province and a U.S. state. The bias looks much smaller if we look at U.S. states. Exports to Canada by each state in the United States are cut in half from ten to five. Now of the sixty units produced by each U.S. state, fifty-five are consumed within the United States, so the state-to-state exports are 1.1 units.
But this model is constructed in such a way as to maximize the trade diversion effects of a border barrier and minimize the trade destruction effects. Total exports of each Canadian province drop only from fifty-nine units to 56.5 when the border barrier is introduced, and exports for each U.S. state drop only from fifty-nine units to 58.9. When a region cannot export its good across national borders it almost exclusively redirects that output toward exports to regions within the country in the AvW model. We can think of the trade barrier between the United States and Canada as creating two customs unions when before there was free trade. But in the AvW model, there is very little trade destruction and a lot of trade diversion.
This means the AvW solution to the home bias puzzle is not entirely convincing. Their model implies that a relatively small trade barrier between the United States and Canada can generate the huge disparities observed empirically. But their model gets there because the small trade barrier does not destroy any trade (or, hardly any), but instead redirects it internally.
Each region might have an import-competing industry. Then a trade barrier between the United States and Canada would lead to an increase in output of the import-competing industries in each region. That is, if there were some ability for resources to move between industries within a province, then the border barrier would not simply redirect trade internally. Instead production of the export industry would decline as resources moved to the importcompeting industries. In such a model it might take a much larger border barrier (than in the AvW calculation) to generate the amount of home bias in trade that we observe. Of course not every province in Canada will have an industry that competes with the imports from the United States. So a border barrier might induce some trade within Canada as one province imports goods from another province that are close substitutes for goods it previously imported from the United States.
A realistic estimate of the size of the trade barrier needed to generate the home bias we observe in trade might require a fairly sophisticated modelperhaps one that is not unlike the CGE models that Anderson and van Wincoop criticize. Such a model would include import-competing industries. The CES assumption would have to be jettisoned because the import-competing goods are, by definition, closer substitutes for imported goods than are the goods produced for export. The endowment model would have to be sacrificed for a model in which goods are produced by factors in order to capture the resource-shifting effects of border barriers. If factors were supplied with some elasticity, then some of the effect of trade barriers would be to reduce production as workers shifted toward leisure. And perhaps factors would shift toward nontradable output as well. At the very least it would be helpful to have a model in which the export/output ratio is not so unreasonably high as it is in the AvW model under free trade.
Into how many regions should a country be broken? There are two ways that one country could be ten times as large as another-it could have ten times as many regions, or each region could be ten times as large. In the AvW analysis, such a distinction makes a big difference to the measured welfare effects of border barriers. The reason is that they do not estimate the elasticity of substitution between products from different regions, but instead borrow estimates from empirical trade models that have quite different structures than the AvW model. Let me explain by way of a simple numerical example.
Suppose we have two countries in the AvW framework. The large country is ten times the size of the small country. Suppose the small country produces eleven units of output. (There is only one region in the small country, so it produces a single type of good.)
I will illustrate the problem by examining the welfare effects of a border barrier that completely eliminates trade between the small country and the large country. Under autarky, each household in the small country consumes only the eleven units of the good it produces. Anderson and van Wincoop take a measure of the elasticity of substitution of five, which they imply is a reasonable value (since they say that ten is "high"). Under symmetric CES preferences, their utility is given by:
Under the symmetric preferences, the small country exports ten units, and imports ten units from the large country. Suppose the large country is composed of ten regions, each of which is equal in size to the small country. Under free trade, households in the small country can consume one unit of each of eleven goods. Utility is given by: An alternative model is one in which the large country also has only one region, and produces 110 units of a single good. Under free trade it exports ten units to the small country. Utility in the small country in this case is given by:
The gains from free trade (versus autarky) in the first model are 82.1 percent, but in the second model only 9.3 percent. Clearly it matters how many regions the big country has, but the AvW model tells us nothing about how to divide a country into regions.
Why should the welfare calculation depend so much on into how many regions a country is divided? What matters is the elasticity of substitution for goods produced in the regions. We can think of both of the models above as ones in which the large country has ten regions. In the first model, the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in each region in the large country is five. In the second model, the elasticity of substitution is infinity.
Which is the correct elasticity? I don't know. But how do AvW know? When they use five as the elasticity, they are drawing that number from estimates of some aggregate elasticity of substitution for internationally traded goods. Those models typically do not subdivide each country into regions. Most importantly, they certainly do not provide us with estimates of the elasticity of substitution for goods produced in different regions of a country.
Such a number seems critical. The difference between a welfare gain of 82.1 percent and 9.3 percent is pretty substantial. I am afraid that what we need to help us with this problem is a more detailed-and therefore less trans-parent-model. Such a model would allow the elasticity of substitution for goods produced within a country to be different than the elasticity of substitution between goods produced internationally. We need to recognize that as we divide a country into more and more regions, we should allow the elasticity of substitution for goods produced within those regions to increase. If we insisted on treating that elasticity as unchanging no matter how finely we divide a country into regions (as AvW do), then we can drive the welfare gains from free trade almost arbitrarily high by defining each and every household as a separate region.
I am a skeptic about applying the estimates of Rose and van Wincoop to calculate the gains from the euro zone or from a potential North American currency union. 6 The first concern is that their data set contains almost exclusively very small countries that have joined currency unions. It is reasonable to interpret their evidence as showing that very small countries in Africa or the Caribbean can benefit substantially from currency unions. But their data just are not capable of telling us how much large countries can gain. The trade regressions in Rose use 33,903 bilateral observations on trade volume. 7 (These are from a panel with trade data for five different years.) Of these, 330 observations are for pairs of countries that are in a currency union. Of those, only two country pairs, United States-Panama and United Kingdom-Ireland (for part of the sample), for a total of seven observations, are pairs in which both countries have over 1 million population and GDP per capita greater than $1,000. The data simply are not informative about how a currency union could affect trade among large, rich countries.
Even for small countries, we cannot be sure of the direction of causality. If I were to come up with a model for predicting what factors would lead two countries to form a currency union, the amount of bilateral trade would be at the very top of my list of explanatory variables. It is not really true, as AvW claim, that Rose uses instrumental variables techniques that deal with this reverse causality problem. 8 In fact, Rose finds that the estimated equations behave badly and provide unbelievable parameter estimates when instruments are used for currency unions. Rose argues that it is indeed very difficult to find appropriate instruments for currency union formation, given that so few unions have been formed. And that is the nub of the problem.
I should admit at this point that I have also written a paper with Rose using the same data. 9 Our aim was to see if actual currency unions were optimal in terms defined by Mundell-high levels of trade, stable real exchange rates, and so on. But we remained neutral on the direction of causality. If currency unions have high levels of trade, for example, it might be because the trade volumes led the countries to join a currency union or the currency union stimulated trade.
This paper is interesting, innovative, and a significant step in our understanding of border effects. It is also thought-provoking and has provoked this final thought: My reading of the empirical literature is that the evidence from the studies on consumer prices is that the border effects appear even larger when examining deviations from the law of one price than they do from trade flows. 10 One explanation is that consumer prices include the cost of marketing and distribution, and that for some reason those costs are greater for producers trying to sell their goods in foreign markets. In this case, the cost of border barriers might be much larger than the trade regressions suggest. This is but one of the many avenues of research that the Anderson and van Wincoop papers are likely to open.
Caroline Freund: As the world struggles with the consequences of increased openness and more interdependence, this paper reminds us that countries are actually much less integrated than is commonly believed. Anderson and van Wincoop find that current trade barriers have a tariff equivalent of about 50 percent in most OECD countries and that removing them would result in an increase in welfare by about 40 percent. Their results are based on a simple model that yields an equation for bilateral trade flows composed of the standard gravity variables plus a relative price term, which depends on country size. They go on to simulate the model, using estimates of trade barriers from the modified gravity equation, to determine welfare outcomes of various policy shocks. Anderson and van Wincoop argue that their approach is preferable to CGE models because it is more transparent, and preferable to standard gravity equations because it is model driven and thus can be used to evaluate welfare effects.
An important contribution of their model is that it yields several hypotheses about how international borders affect large and small countries differently. The basic intuition is that a given border imposes a smaller distortion on a large country than on a small country because a smaller proportion of total trade (intranational and international) is affected. This size effect has important implications for the estimation of the large border effects found in previous work. After adjusting for size, Anderson and van Wincoop find that Canadian provinces trade six times more with each other than with otherwise similar U.S. states, significantly less than the twenty-two found in previous work.
11 But, six is still a large number, given the relatively open border between the United States and Canada, which warrants further investigation into its makeup and its possible welfare costs.
The main point of the paper is to provide a general methodology that can be used to evaluate the welfare costs of trade barriers. On this front the authors are somewhat less successful. They argue that previous gravity equations are ad hoc, precluding welfare analysis, while theirs is directly linked to theory. But there are now numerous papers that provide a theoretical backing for the gravity equation, which in principle could be used to analyze welfare.
12 Indeed the monopolistic competition model has been used by Frankel, Stein, and Wei among others, in combination with the gravity equation, to evaluate how the formation of preferential trade agreements affects welfare. 13 Still the trend has been to treat these models only as providing a foundation for the gravity equation. In part this is because so many models can yield a gravity equation that it is impossible to discern which is the true model. In addition, several of the assumptions needed to generate the simple gravity setup make these models unsatisfactory for welfare analysis of specific agreements.
First, one common feature of these models is that they rely on perfect specialization. In this vein, the Anderson-van Wincoop model depicts the world as being composed of many one-good endowment economies. Therefore a policy shock, such as a customs union or a currency union, only affects trade through terms-of-trade changes, trade flow changes, and changes in spending on nonproductive endeavors, such as hiring a lawyer to negotiate entry into a foreign market. But using these criteria to judge trade agreements is deceptive because they fail to take into account the effects of foreign competition on the allocation of resources and on domestic competition-precisely the areas that are most important for raising living standards.
Second, another common feature of these models is that they rely on identical preferences, implying that welfare results are dependent on exogenous assumptions about the elasticity of substitution among goods. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop estimate that Canada's welfare gain from a removal of all border barriers is 52 percent if the elasticity of substitution is five. However, if the elasticity is ten the gain drops to 20 percent. The authors claim that ten is a large estimate, which might be true for consumer goods, but international trade is composed of many types of goods, some of which certainly are perfect substitutes, such as steel, wheat, and oil.
Third, in contrast to a gravity model, a standard neoclassical trade model does not make predictions about bilateral trade patterns-thus any pattern of trade could be optimal, as could any size border effect. For example, intranational trade might be greater than international trade because boundaries are drawn around areas that are natural trade partners, either because of tastes, endowments, or technology, none of which enter into the gravity equation.
The authors illustrate their technique using three examples: removing all borders in the OECD, evaluating the effects of currency unions, and examining the NAFTA accord. I think the OECD experiment is the most interesting because the assumptions are somewhat more plausible. The authors find that the removal of borders among OECD countries has a significant impact on trade. For example trade between the United States and the OECD increases by 150 percent and welfare expands by about 40 percent in most countries. Since tariffs are already very low in the OECD, the barriers must come from other sources, implying that trade policy is no longer the most effective tool for enhancing openness among these countries. Rather, true goods market integration can only be achieved by integration in other areas, such as a harmonization of legal and regulatory systems, a widening of distribution chains, and a greater assimilation of cultures across countries. We therefore need a better understanding of how these and other factors contribute to generating large border effects, in order to evaluate whether it is optimal (or even feasible) to create a truly integrated global economy.
The authors seem to be undecided about whether they want to tackle this question of what these borders actually represent. Initially they state that "it is an important task for future research" and their "results only indicate that [borders] are large and that they have large consequences for trade and welfare." But, ultimately they do attempt to answer this question by investigating whether the estimated size of the border effect is a result of different currencies. They find the answer to be an emphatic yes; about half of the total border barrier is attributable to different currencies.
While these results are suggestive of an important link, they should be interpreted cautiously. Their estimation attributes integration to the currency union, when it is equally plausible that countries which trade a lot and where borders are less important are more likely to be members of a currency union. Moreover the countries that share common currencies tend to have complex historical linkages that also affect trade, so without some time-series variation it is not clear that the possible omitted variable bias can be overcome.
Finally, many of the problems with using this model to determine the welfare effects of specific trade agreements are underscored in the NAFTA experiment. The authors estimate that Mexican welfare declined as a result of NAFTA because of a significant deterioration in the terms of trade. But as noted above, welfare gains resulting from a more efficient allocation of resources and improved productivity growth are ignored. In fact these have been quite important in Mexico, as there was a significant shift in industrial production following the NAFTA accord. Indicative of this cross-sectoral shift, manufactures' share of exports increased from less than 50 percent in 1990 to 85 percent in 1998 and value added in manufacturing as a percent of GDP in Mexico expanded from 17 percent in 1994 to 21 percent in 1999.
14 In sum the authors find that national borders significantly restrict international trade, suggesting that there are large gains to be had from removing them. They argue that it would be useful to have a simple model to evaluate the welfare costs of these trade barriers. While I am sympathetic to this view, I am concerned that using a gravity-based model will generate policy conclusions in many cases that would not be robust to a more realistic model of trade.
General discussion: Gordon Hanson applauded the empirical exercise of trying to make the gravity equation rigorous and then trying to look at implications for welfare. But he pointed out that the assumption of an elasticity of substitution of five for Mexico might be problematic. Fifty percent of Mexico's exports are by maquiladoras, which just do assembly of U.S. inputs. When you look at United States-Mexico trade, you find that the United States and Mexico fill out the product space very well. This is not due to a lack of substitutability, but to specialization in different parts of a production process in the same industry. A different model that accounted for that would give us very different terms of trade effects.
Dani Rodrik pointed out that there is convergence in the literature that border effects are very large, while explicit trade barriers in the form of trade policies, tariffs and quotas, are generally small. Would the removal of these border effects be desirable when this amounts to the global harmonization of laws and regulations (and not simply removal of tariffs and quotas)? He suggested that the right way to think about this question is not in terms of traditional trade models, but in the context of the provision of public goods. Laws and regulations are public goods, and the issue that arises is what is the appropriate level at which such public goods should be provided? We know from local public finance that there is a trade-off here. Preferences for public goods are heterogeneous across countries, and therefore there are costs to harmonization-inability to cater to local preferences-that need to be traded off against the trade benefits. So this literature should not be used to jump too quickly to the conclusion that trade negotiations now ought to be about harmonizing laws and regulations. Ralph Bryant underscored the point made by Rodrik. He pointed out that there is a tendency to speak too loosely about border barriers, as though anything at the border that inhibits trade is somehow defined as a barrier. Once we start thinking about institutions and cultural values and social networks, and the differences among regions within a country, we do not expect trade to be equally dense across these institutions and cultural networks that produce public goods. He gave the example of the Pennsylvania Dutch community in Pennsylvania, and its trade within that community versus trade at an equal distance away, in New York State or Maryland. We probably would not feel comfortable discarding the dense linkages here as a barrier, a border, between that community and others.
Paula Stern asked whether the authors would comment on the likely trade effects from the negotiations between the United States and Chile. These negotiations are dealing not only with tariffs and quotas, but also with issues of standards and other elusive border barriers.
In his response, Eric van Wincoop said that he thought of this paper as a starting point in thinking about welfare questions. It is trade, not welfare, that matters. There is very little empirical work on the welfare implications of various trade barriers. There are complicated CGE models, but nobody really understands what is going on in these models. Eric van Wincoop said that their model is simple, but can be extended in different directions. With more realistic modeling of production, for example, there would be greater specialization and more sensitivity of trade levels to barriers. Also, you would probably find that border barriers are lower than the ones estimated here, because a smaller reduction in barriers leads to a larger effect on trade, and smaller welfare effects. With regard to the elasticity of substitution, an alternative would be to introduce differences in elasticities of substitution across groups of goods. With production added, one could also talk about intermediate goods.
